Thus, America was fighting the wrong war in the wrong place. The introduction, however, of such new developments as the crossbow, longbow, halberd, pike, and, above all, gunpowder began to revolutionize the conduct of war. Summers uses Clausewitz to castigate the civilians responsible for Vietnam, President Johnson and Secretary McNamara's systems analysts, for failing to set objectives with a chance of victory. An important study of the war by a career officer, applying Clausewitz's principles to the actual conduct of the war. The book states that if we had stuck with Clausewitz' theories on war and had a clear strategy created by political factors, carried out by military , then we would have been successful. That said, its not a particularly good book. As a battalion level officer in Vietnam, Summers should have something to say about the tool of ambush and mines, and the difficulty in bringing communist guerrillas to battle.
Collection General Military History Title On : the in. Summers was an infantry squad leader in the Korean War and a battalion and corps operations officer in the Vietnam War. Summers explains that we never lost a battle but that we did indeed lose the war. While at the sale, I noticed many of the books were being pulled out of old boxes at the back of the store. Started out so strong and interesting and after a while I felt a little like the author was repeating the same thoughts over and over and just changing up how he presented them in each new chapter.
. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986. Text is clean and unmarked. Clean, square, tight, unmarked copy. The key take away was that regardless of military or material means capabilities and ends political policy , the lack of coherent and appropriate ways military strategy led to America's ultimate defeat. Military Strategy and Force Posture for the 21st Century: Capabilities and Requirements 1994 ; Liddell Hart, B.
At ThriftBooks, our motto is: Read More, Spend Less. In the years following 1940, the American Army, and above all its professional officer corps, had grown accustomed to a substantial amount of respect and even deference. Two key technological developments in the war were to fashion the strategic and tactical debates of the 1920s and 1930s. Harry Summers, whose book, On Strategy, has become must reading for young officers. They direct the inquiry exclusively toward physical quantities, whereas all military actio Quotes from people like Lieutnant General James F. Summers applied various elements of Clausewitz' war theories to explain the environment and the engagement.
Calling it a work of history is a bit misleading. Purchased from long time Charlotte bookstore all new books liquidation sale. Army senior leadership is close behind, for failing for the siren lure of counter-insurgency and failing to hold to traditional strategic arts in a nuclear era. One may disagree with his conclusions, but one hopes that there are more like him. The Middle Ages saw a decline in the study and application of strategy — with the exception of the great Mongol conqueror Genghis Khan. Using a strategy of interior lines, Frederick — supported by a highly disciplined army and horse artillery his creation — would quickly maneuver, assemble a superior force at some decisive point along the line of encirclement, and, with massed howitzer fire, strike hard against an enemy flank before moving to another point. Summers argues that American leaders misread the lesson of the Korean war.
He delivered on the negotiation panel for the United States at the end of the Vietnam War. This in itself i have no issue with. Army in Vietnam, 1941-1960 and Eagle Against the Sun: The American War with Japan. Bernard Montgomery at El Alamein 1942. His purpose was to draw strategic lessons from the Vietnam experience. Intended neither as a history of the Vietnam involvement nor as a definitive account of the war, summers motivated military strategic thinking so that America remains prepared for the future challenges. Where would China be in all of this? Defensive-offensive maneuvers include attack from a strong defensive position after the attacking enemy has been sapped in strength, as in two battles of the Hundred Years' War, the Battle of CrÃ©cy 1346 and the Battle of Agincourt 1415 , or feigned withdrawals that attempt to lure the enemy out of position as performed by William the Conqueror at the Battle of Hastings 1066 and by Napoleon at the Battle of Austerlitz 1805.
All pages are intact, and the cover is intact. The growth in range and accuracy of rifle firepower created new tactical problems: artillery had to be placed farther behind the lines, massed charges became ineffective if not disastrous, cavalry became limited to reconnaissance and skirmish, and troops began to fight from trenches and use grenades and land mines. Very rare in new condition. My final assessment is that Summers wants to have his cake and eat it to. Clean, square, tight, unmarked copy. Although it would also have meant a commitment to victory, victory would have been defined as the achievement of a specific, limited political objective—the creation of an independent South Vietnam—not the unconditional surrender of the North Vietnamese. Napoleonic strategy and tactics were closely studied by the first great theorists of war, the Prussian general Carl von Clausewitz 1780—1831 and the French general Antoine Jomini 1779—1869.
A senior So This is an important work for any American trying to understand Clausewitz. Instead it fought a conventional-type conflict with heavy reliance on firepower, employing forces organized and equipped for the mid-intensity European battlefield. His disciplined national standing army — differing from the common use of mercenaries — was organized into small, mobile units armed with highly superior, maneuverable firepower and supplemented by mounted dragoons his creation armed with carbine and saber. According to Summers, we misdirected our efforts because our military leaders allowed the foremost question—what are we trying to do? Applying the principles of war based on the classic On War by Carl von Clausewitz to the actual conduct of the fighting in Vietnam, the author provides some cogent answers to this question. That said, its not a particularly good book. Very rare in new condition.